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Abstract—Most behavioral detectors of malware remain
specific to a given language and platform, mostly PE
executables for Windows. The objective of this paper is to
define a generic approach for behavioral detection based
on two layers respectively responsible for abstraction and
detection. The first abstraction layer remains specific to
a platform and a language. This first layer interprets
the collected instructions, API calls and arguments and
classifies these operations as well as the involved objects
according to their purpose in the malware lifecycle. The
second detection layer remains generic and is totally in-
teroperable between the different abstraction components.
This layer relies on parallel automata parsing attribute-
grammars where semantic rules are used for object typing
(object classification) and object binding (data-flow). To
feed detection and to experiment with our approach we
have developed two different abstraction components: one
processing system call traces from native code and one pro-
cessing the VBScript interpreted language. The different
experimentations have provided promising detection rates,
in particular for script files (89%), with almost none false
positives. In the case of process traces, the detection rate
remains significant (51%) but could be increased by more
sophisticated collection tools.
Keywords: Malware behaviors – Attribute grammars –
Collection mechanisms – System calls and arguments
interpretation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware behavioral detection is an active research
field since the behavioral approach should theoretically
be able to detect, if not innovative malware, at least un-
known malware reusing variations of known techniques.
With regards to actual known methods of behavioral de-
tection, most of them rely on specific characteristics; this
enables evasion through simple functional modifications:
the regular reappearance of new versions from known
strains, de facto multiplying the detection signatures,
is an obvious consequence. The leading objective of
this article is to provide a generic grammar for global
malicious behaviors in order to build efficient and re-
silient detection automata. Genericity is introduced in
the process by an abstraction from the platform and the
language.
The use of deterministic finite automata to detect
behaviors is an attractive idea since the complexity of
these algorithms remains linear and thus acceptable for
operational deployment. Published in 1995, [1] uses au-
tomata to structure the possible sequences of operations
making up behaviors, but this, without real control of the
data flow. Since, various works in computer security have
focused on this notion of data flow, finally leading to the
apparition of tainting techniques to detect malicious uses
of data [2]. These techniques have exhibited significant
successes and the notion of data flow control is now
broadly used, like in intrusion detection [3] and malware
behavior extraction [4]. These two articles use automata
to model different sequences of system calls constituting
respectively attacks and malicious behaviors. The data
flow is then captured by analysis of the parameters
collected along these system calls. In parallel, a similar
detection technique focusing on self-reproduction behav-
iors has been published, the authors arguing that self-
replication was the only decisive characteristic common
to all malware [5]. Our approach also combines these
two aspects: detection by automata and flow control.
However, it does not restrict itself to a single behavior.
We think that monitoring a unique behavior without
correlation with other potential malicious actions may
prove insufficient for reliable detection. We have thus
defined a generative model to describe several classes
of malicious behaviors and assessed the detection of
different behaviors descriptions.
In fact, the detection method we use can be related
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to methods of attack scenario recognition in intrusion
detection [6]. In these methods, isolated alerts are cor-
related into a scenario by parsing attribute-grammars
annoted with semantic rules to guarantee the flow be-
tween the different related alerts. In the context of
malware detection, malicious behaviors are also de-
scribed through attribute-grammars: on the one hand,
the syntactic rules describe the possible combinations
for the basic operations making up the behavior, on
the other hand, the semantic rules control the data flow
between the elements involved in these operations, but
also associate to these elements a potential purpose in
the malware lifecycle (installation, communication or
execution). The detection process is therefore achieved
by parsing techniques. In order to feed detection, an
additional abstraction process is required to translate the
observable data into the model. Abstraction provides a
generic level of description where the processed data
become detached from the specificities of the platform
and any programming language. With regards to the
generation of the grammatical behavior descriptions, the
identification of the system objects with a potential use
for malware or the language abstraction: all these oper-
ations require a first configuration step as described in
Figure 1. However, contrary to other detection methods,
the configuration focuses both on critical system objects,
which remain enumerable in a standard applicative en-
vironment, and innovative malware, which are scarce
among the numerous variants of known malware. This
contribution can finally be sum up in three main points:
• A model of malicious behaviors by attribute-
grammars with semantic rules for object binding
in order (control the data flow) and object typing
(convey the potential purpose of objects in the
malware lifecycle).
• The introduction of an abstraction layer for transla-
tion into the model, detaching the detection process
from the specificities of the platform and program-
ming languages. As proofs of concept, two specific
abstraction components have been developed for the
analysis of executable traces and interpreted scripts.
• Several generic automata to detect different classes
of behaviors. Different assessments are made both
from the theoretical perspectives (time and space
complexities) and from the operational perspectives
(coverage and performance).
The article is articulated as follows. For the article
to be self-contained, it first introduces in Section II a
behavioral model based on attribute-grammars which
recalls and synthesizes results from previous works.
Section III deals with the abstraction process from the
collected data to the behavioral model. Section IV de-
scribes the detection process based on parsing automata.
An implementation is presented in Section V whose
results are interpreted and commented in Section VI.
II. FORMALIZATION OF MALICIOUS BEHAVIORS
USING ATTRIBUTE-GRAMMARS
From a theoretical perspective an attribute-grammar
is a Context-Free Grammar (CFG) enriched with
semantic attributes and rules [7]. A complete definition
is detailed below. In the particular case of behavioral
detection, each start symbols begins the description of
a new malicious behavior. The production rules then
describe the different technical solutions to achieve
this behavior whereas the terminal symbols of the
grammar correspond to the data collected through the
abstraction layer (interpretations of instructions, API
calls, arguments) [8], [9]. Based on these principles,
the coming sections more specifically address the
grammatical model of the behavior descriptions.
Definition 1: An attributed-grammar GA is a triplet
<G,D,E> where:
- G is originally a context-free grammar <V,Σ, S, P>,
- let Att = Syn unionmulti Inh be a set of attributes divided
between the synthesized and the inherited attributes,
and D = ∪α∈AttDα be the union of their sets of values,
- let att : X ∈ {V ∪ Σ} −→ att(X) ∈ Att∗ be an
attribute assignment function,
- every production rule pi ∈ P of the form
Y0 −→ Y1...Yn determines a set of attributes
V arpi = ∪i∈{0,...,n}{Yi.α | α ∈ att(Yi)} partitioned
between inner variables: Inpi = {Y0.α | α ∈
att(Y0) ∩ Syn} ∪ {Yi.α | i 6= 0, α ∈ att(Yi) ∩ Inh},
and outer variables: Outpi = V arpi \ Inpi,
- E is a set of semantic rules such as for any production
rule pi ∈ P , for each inner variable Yi.α ∈ Inpi, there is
exactly one rule of the form Yi.α = f(Y1.α1...Yn.αn)
where Yj .αk ∈ Outpi and f : Dα1 × ...×Dαn → Dα.
A. Malicious Behavior Language
A generic programming language is required to
describe any malicious behavior: to this purpose, a
generic language, called the Malicious Behavior Lan-
guage (MBL), has been developed in a previous article
giving its syntax and operational semantic [8]. Most
malicious behaviors can be described by sub-grammars
Figure 1. Configuration and detection processes.
of this generative grammar, that is to say: the different
behavior languages are included in the MBL. In a few
word, the MBL relies on basic arithmetic and control
operations guaranteeing the Turing completeness as well
as additional interaction operations: commands (open,
create, close, delete) or inputs/outputs (send, receive,
signal, wait). As discussed in the article, malware being
highly resilient and adaptable by nature, interaction
operations are key features of this language.
In addition to the syntax of these operations, a
type system has been provided for the external ob-
jects adressed by the interactions. The different objects
have been typed according to their potential use in the
malware lifecycle: permanent objects (obj perm), tem-
porary objects (obj temp), booting object (obj boot),
communicating objects (obj com), self-reference (this).
A partial order has been defined on these types according
to their subset inclusion, as shown in Figure 2. The se-
mantic attributes enriching attribute-grammars will prove
useful to deploy such a type system. In fact, semantic
attributes and rules can be used for several purposes:
Object binding: This mechanism identifies the dif-
ferent instances of objects and variables and
guarantees they are coherently used. Object
binding can simply be achieved by affecting
specific attributes called identifiers to the termi-
nal symbols representing these objects (denoted
objId in the semantic rules). In the context
of interactions, object binding is also used
for studying the data-flow between objects. As
shown in the next section, it is particularly im-
portant in behaviors such as duplication where
the viral code is transferred from the self-
reference to a target object.
Object typing: A type attribute can also be affected
to a given object (denoted objTp). Types are
attached to objects according to their potential
uses. This is particularly important to discover
malicious purposes such as booting objects
in the case of residency or communicating
objects in the case of propagation. Additional
characterisation of the objects can be achieved
through additional attributes. For example, an
attribute can be defined to store the nature of an
object (denoted objNat): variable, file, registry
key, network socket, mail, etc. Typing may
then be refined according to these additional
attributes.
Figure 2. Partial order on object types. The partial order has been
defined according the inclusions of the different subsets which are
represented by the different edges of the Hasse Diagram (for example:
obj perm ≤ obj boot). In fact, the set inclusions correspond to a
specialization of the objects according to their use in the malware
lifecycle.
B. Descriptions of malicious behaviors
Use of this grammar is best illustrated by different
examples of behavioral descriptions. In this article, we
focus ourselves on four different behaviors. Because
their whole descriptions would be too tedious, this
section only covers two of the most spread behaviors:
duplication and propagation. The other considered
behaviors are residency (automatic start of the malware)
and overinfection tests. Their preliminary descriptions,
as well as others’ (infection, mutation, activity tests),
have been manually generated in the original paper
by analysing a large pool of malware [8]. Since the
behavioral descriptions only convey the most generic
features of the malicious behaviors, manual generation
of these behavioral signatures can be considered more
easily than for the binary signatures used in scanning
techniques.
1) Duplication: Duplication is achieved by
copying data from the self-reference towards a
newly created permanent object. It can be described
by the following syntactic production rules (grey)
and their additional semantic rules (white). The
different syntactic derivations correspond to the
different duplication techniques: single-block read/write
operations, interleaved read/write and direct copy,
with possible operation permutations. The semantic
rules are more interesting because they can both
guarantee the data-flow between objects: the read
and write operations must refer to the same variable
(Object Binding: <Write>.varId =<Read>.varId),
and guarantee the maliciousness of the behavior:
the open and read operations must refer to the self-
reference to be a real duplication (Object Typing:
<Duplicate>.srcTp = this).
(i) <Duplicate> ::= <Create><Open><Read><Write>
| <Open><Create><Read><Write>
| <Open><Read><Create><Write>
| <Open><Create><IntrlvRW>
| <Create><Open><IntrlvRW>
{ <Duplicate>.srcId = <Open>.objId
<Read>.objId = <Duplicate>.srcId
<IntrlvRW>.obj1Id = <Duplicate>.srcId
<Duplicate>.srcTp = this
<Open>.objTp = <Duplicate>.srcTp
<Read>.objTp = <Duplicate>.srcTp
<IntrlvRW>.obj1Tp = <Duplicate>.srcTp
<Duplicate>.targId = <Create>.objId
<Write>.objId = <Duplicate>.targId
<IntrlvRW>.obj2Id = <Duplicate>.targId
<Duplicate>.targTp = obj perm
<Create>.objTp = <Duplicate>.targTp
<Write>.objTp = <Duplicate>.targTp
<IntrlvRW>.obj2Tp = <Duplicate>.targTp
<Write>.varId = <Read>.varId }
| <DrctCopy>
{ <Duplication>.srcId = <DrctCopy>.obj1Id
<Duplication>.srcTp = this
<DrctCopy>.obj1Tp = <Duplicate>.srcTp
<Duplicate>.targId = <DrctCopy>.obj2Id
<Duplicate>.targTp = obj perm
<DrctCopy>.obj2Tp = <Duplicate>.targTp }
(ii) <Create> ::= create object;
{ <Create>.objId = object.objId
object.objTp = <Create>.objTp }
(iii) <Open> ::= open object;
{ <Open>.objId = object.objId
object.objTp = <Open>.objTp }
(iv) <Read> ::= receive object1← object2;
{ <Read>.varId = object1.objId
object1.objTp = var
object2.objId = <Read>.objId
object2.objTp = <Read>.objTp }
(v) <Write> ::= send object1→ object2;
{ <Write>.varId = object1.objId
object1.objTp = var
object2.objId = <Write>.objId
object2.objTp = <Write>.objTp }
(vi) <IntrlvRW> ::= while(receive object1← object2; ){
send object3→ object4;
}
{ object3.objId = object1.objId
object1.objTp = var
object3.objTp = var
object2.objId = <IntrlvRW>.obj1Id
object2.objTp = <IntrlvRW>.obj1Tp
object4.objId = <IntrlvRW>.obj2Id
object4.objTp = <IntrlvRW>.obj2Tp }
(vii) <DirectCopy> ::= send object1→ object2;
{ <DrctCopy>.obj1Id = object1.objId
object1.objTp = <DrctCopy>.obj1Tp
<DrctCopy>.obj2Id = object2.objId
object2.objTp = <DrctCopy>.obj2Tp }
2) Propagation: Propagation differs from duplication
by copying the data from the self-reference towards
a communicating object. Consequently, propagation
shows some syntactic similarities with duplication
with additional readjustments to insert a potential
format process: their main differences thus lie in
the semantic rules. Two major modifications are
brought to the start propagation production rule.
The first modification replaces the permanent type
for the target object by the communicating type
(<Propagate>.targTp = obj com). A communicating
object can be a network connection, a file shared
over P2P folders or networks drives, or a simple
mail. This example illustrates the importance of
typing. The second modification specifies that
the source of propagation can be either the auto-
reference or the intermediate result of the duplication
(<Propagate>.srcTp = this∨ <Propagate>.srcId
=<Duplicate>.targId). These alternatives explain the
disjunction of semantic equations.
(i) <Propagate> ::= <Open><Read><Transmit>
| <Read><Open><Transmit>
{ ...
(<Propagate>.srcTp = this
∨ <Propagate>.srcId = <Duplication>.targId)
...
<Propagate>.targTp = obj com
... }
(ii) <Transmit> ::= <Format><Write>
| <Write>
III. TRANSLATION INTO THE LANGUAGE USING
ABSTRACTION
In the context of detection, a set of data giving infor-
mation about the structure or the actions of the malicious
code is statically or dynamically collected. According to
the level of the collection mechanism, the completeness
of the available data is strongly impacted and the nature
of this data may vary from simple instructions to system
calls along with their parameters. These collected data
remain specific to a given platform and to the language
in which a piece of malware has been coded (native,
interpreted or macro code). A first translation layer is
thus required to abstract the collected data into a generic
behavioral language (see Section II). Translation of basic
instructions, either arithmetic (move, addition, subtrac-
tion...) or control related (conditional, jump...), into oper-
ations of the behavioral language is an obvious mapping
which does not require further explanation. With regards
to API calls and their parameters, their translation into
interactions and objects from the behavioral language
turns out to be more complex. Consequently, the two
following parts focus on these aspects.
A. API calls translation
For an arbitrary program to access any service
or resource from its environment, the Application
Programming Interfaces (API) constitute a mandatory
point enforcing security and consistency between the
different accesses [10]. In the common case of native
code accessing kernel services from the operating
system, API calls are also denoted system calls but
the first notation will prevail to remain consistent. For
each programming language the set of available API
can be classified into distinct interaction operations.
This set of API being finite and supposedly stable, the
translation can be defined as a direct mapping over
the space of the interaction classes, guaranteeing the
completeness of the process. A part of this mapping
is given in Table I for a subset of the Windows
Native API (Ntdll: [11]), as well as a subset of the
VBScript API functions. The table has been refined
according to the nature of the manipulated objects.
The API name, on its own, is not always sufficient to
determine the interaction class as the network example
demonstrates. Network managers and simple files use
common API: for a clear distinction, the file path
must also be interpreted (\device\Afd\Endpoint
under Windows). Sending and receiving operations then
depends on the driver control code transmitted with
NtDeviceIoControlFile (IOCTL_AFD_RECV,
IOCTL_AFD_SEND [12]). When required, parameters
thus become additional inputs of the mapping:
{API name} × ({Parameters} ∪ {}) →
{Interaction class}.
B. Parameters interpretation
Parameters are important factors in interactions, not
only to distinguish certain ambiguous classes of interac-
tions like in the previous network example. Parameters
also identify the different objects involved in interactions
and assess their criticality through the typing of these
objects. Interpretation of the parameters thus finishes
the abstraction from the platform and language begun
with the API translation. Due to their various natures,
parameters can not be translated using a simple mapping
like for API. Basically, decision trees are more adaptive
tools capable of interpreting parameters according to
their representation:
Simple integers: Integer attributes are mainly
constants specific to an associated API.
They mainly condition the interpretation
of the interaction class of the API. For
NtDeviceIoControlFile, the different
IO control codes are typical examples. A sim-
ple hard-coded comparison is required to detect
the main important constants.
Address and Handles: Addresses and handles are
mainly used to identify the different objects
appearing in the collected data. These param-
eters are particularly useful to study the data
Table I
WINDOWS NATIVE AND VBSCRIPT API MAPPING TO INTERACTION CLASSES.
flow between object. A variable for exemple
may be represented by an address av and a
potential size sv. Every address a such as av ≤
a ≤ av + sv will refer to the same variable.
Certain addresses have important properties
and may be refined by typing: import tables,
services descriptor table, entry points... In order
to interpret these specific elements, a possible
decision tree based on the partitioning of the
address space is proposed in the Figure 2 .
Character strings: String parameters contains the
richer information about objects to interpret.
Most of these parameters are paths satisfying
a hierarchical structure where every element is
important: from the root element identifying
drives, drivers and registry paths, passing by
the intermediate directories providing object
localization, until the real name of the object.
The hierarchical structure of the paths is well
adapted for a progressive analysis which can
once again be modelled as a decision tree.
Such a tree is described in the Figure 3 for a
more complex string interpretation.
Figure 3. Addresses interpretation.
Figure 4. Character strings interpretation.
Building decision trees requires a precise identification
of the critical resources of a system. A methodology,
reproducible to various systems, is to proceed by consid-
ering successively the different system layers: hardware
layer, operating system layer and applicative layer. For
each layer, a scope must be defined encompassing the
significant components; the resources involved either in
the installation, the configuration or the use of these
components must then be analyzed for potential misuse:
Hardware layer: For the hardware layer, the scope
has been restricted to the different interfaces
open to external locations (Network, CD,
USB). With respect tothe conditions of use of
these interfaces, the main resources to consider
remain the drivers used to communicate with
the interfaces. Additional configuration files
must also be considered because they may
impact the connection parameters (”host” file)
or the booting of the external element (”au-
torun.inf” for example).
Operating system layer: The configuration of the
operating system is critical but is unfortunately
dispersed in various locations (files, structures
and tables in memory, registry keys). The
scope is proportionally broadened. However,
the critical resources are already well identified
considering important aspects such as the boot
sequence or the intermediate structures used to
access the services and resources provided by
the operating system (file system, process table,
system call table...).
Applicative layer: It is obviously impossible to con-
sider all existing applications. To restrict the
scope, the analysis must consider only con-
nected and widely deployed applications (web
browsers, mail clients, peer-to-peer clients,
messaging, IRC clients). This restriction makes
sense since malware, with regards to their
propagation and interoperability requirements,
must operate on a scale of platforms as large
as possible. Once again for these applications,
the resources involved in the communication
(connections, transit locations) as well as in
the configuration (application launch), must be
considered.
This identification of the critical resources used by
malware is a complex manual configuration step, but
nevertheless necessary. This identification process is
however less cumbersome than analyzing the thousands
of malware samples collected every day. Once these
critical resources pinpointed, the configuration can be
retrieved in a partially automated way. For example, the
nature of the different drives can be recovered automat-
ically (local, network, removable media). Similarly, the
different installed peer-to-peer clients can be detected
and their shared directories recovered. The localization
of the system call and interrupt tables can also be recov-
ered and so on. From our opinion, a full automation of
the parameter interpretation may be very hard to achieve.
With regards to intrusion detection, some attempts at
fully-automated analysis of the system call parameters
have been put forward for anomaly-based detectors [13].
Their parameter interpretation relied on some deviation
measurements from a legitimate model based on string
length, character distribution and structural inference.
These factors are significant for intrusion mainly because
most attacks used misformatted parameters to take ad-
vantage from a weakness of the system implementation.
This approach should prove less efficient with malware
since they mainly use legitimate or legitimate appearing
parameters. Moreover these anomaly-based approaches
do not explain the use of the object for the malware; this
would require an additional manual analysis. Fortunately,
critical resources for a given platform are quite restricted
and can potentially be enumerated. Thus, parameter
interpretation by decision trees seems a good trade off
between partial automation and manual analysis of the
platform facilities.
IV. DETECTION USING PARSING AUTOMATA
As a consequence of the attribute-grammar
formalization, detecting malicious behaviors can
be reduced to the problem of parsing their grammatical
description. Before going any further, we must state
two important hypothesises. These grammars must
be both LL grammars and L-attribute grammars:
attribute dependencies are only allowed from left to
right in the production rules. These hypothesises are
important since they condition the fact that syntactic
parsing and attribute evaluation can be achieved in
a single pass. These properties are not necessarily
satisfied by the MBL generative grammar but they
prove true for the sub-grammars describing the different
malicious behaviors (see Section II). Detection can
then be implemented by LL-parsers responsible for the
top-down construction of annoted leftmost-derivation
trees. LL-parsers are basically pushdown automata with
attribute evaluation as given in the Definition 2 below.
Definition 2: A LL-parser is a particular pushdown
automaton A that can be built as a ten-tuple
<Q,Σ, D,Γp,Γs, δ, q0, Zp,0, Zs,0, F> where:
- Q is the finite set of states,
- Σ is the alphabet of input symbols and D the set of
possible values for attributes,
- Γp is the alphabet of the parsing stack and Γs the
alphabet of the semantic stack,
- δ is the transition function of the form
Q × ({Σ ∪ }, D∗) × (Γp,Γs) → Q × ({Γp ∪ },Γs)
which defines both the production rules and the semantic
routines,
- q0 ∈ Q is the initial state,
- Zp,0 and Zs,0 are respectively the initial symbol of the
parsing and semantic stacks,
- F ⊂ Q is the set of accepting states.
Because several behaviors are monitored, a dedicated
automaton is deployed in parallel for each of these
behaviors. A single automaton can parse several
instances of the behavior storing its progress in
independent states and stacks. For each read input,
all automata progress along their derivation trees at
the same time as described in the Figure 4. When an
irrelevant input is read (an operation interleaved inside
the behavior for example), instead of causing an error
state in the automata, this input is simply dropped. The
global algorithm is procedurally defined below:
Procedure: BehaviorDetection(e1,...,et)
where ei are collected events (input symbol combined with
semantic values: ({Σ ∪ }, D∗))
For each collected event ei do:
| For all the automata Ak from k = 1 to k ≤ n do:
| | m = number of derivation;
| | For all state and stack triple (Qk,j ,Γpk,j ,Γsk,j)
| | from j = 1 to j ≤ m do:
| | | Ak.ll-parse(ei,(Qk,j ,Γpk,j ,Γsk,j))
| | Next
| Next
Next
Procedure: A.ll-parse(e,(Q,Γp,Γs))
If e, Q, Γp, Γs match a transition T ∈ δA Then
| If ei introduces a possible ambiguity
| Then duplicate state and stack triple (Q,Γp,Γs)
| Compute transition T to update (Q,Γp,Γs)
| If Q is an accepting state Q ∈ FA
| Then Malicious behavior detected
Else ignore ei
End if
Listing: Detection algorithm based on parallel automata.
Figure 5. Parallel automata for behavioral detection. The collected
events ei containing the input symbols and semantic values are
fed into the parsing parallel automata Ak. Each of these automata
manages a set of independent states qk, parsing and semantic stacks
Γpk, Γsk corresponding to different derivations.
A. Semantic routines for prerequisites and consequences
A malicious behavior is basically a sequence of op-
erations where each operation prepares for the next
one. Looking at recent works in intrusion detection,
an intrusion scenario has been defined similarly as a
sequence of dependent attacks [14], [15]. For each attack
to occur, a set of prerequisites or preconditions must
be satisfied. When completed, the attack generates new
consequences, also called postconditions. In a formal-
ization of malicious behaviors by attribute grammars,
the sequence order is driven by the syntax whereas
prerequisites and consequences can be directly modelled
by semantic rules of the form Yi.α = f(Y1.α1...Yn.αn)
(see Definition 1).
Checking prerequisites: Prerequisites are defined
by specific semantic rules where the attributes
at the left side of the equation are attached to a
terminal symbol (Yi ∈ Σ). During parsing a se-
mantic value is collected with the input symbol
and transmitted to the automaton. This value
is then compared to the computed value using
the inherited and already synthesized attributes.
The comparison correspond to the matching
step on the semantic stack Γs performed during
a transition from δ.
Evaluating consequences: When the left-side at-
tribute is attached to a non-terminal (Yi ∈ V ),
and all right-side inherited and synthesized
attributes are valued, the new attribute can be
evaluated. The evaluation corresponds to the
reduction step performed during a transition
from δ: this transition results in a modification
of the semantic stack Γs where the new value
has been pushed.
B. Ambiguity support
In the detection algorithm, all events are confronted
to the behavior automata. However these events may
be sometimes unrelated to the behavior or unuseful to
complete the behavior. Unrelated events do not match
any transition in the parsing procedure and are simply
dropped. But this measure reveals itself insufficient for
unuseful events which raise ambiguities in the sense that
they may be related to the behavior but parsing them
makes the derivation fail unpredictably. Let us take an
explicit example in the case of duplication: after opening
the self-reference, two files are consecutively created. If
duplication is achieved between the self-reference and
the first file, parsing will succeed. On the opposite, if
duplication is achieved between the self-reference and
the second one, parsing will fail. This can be explained
by the fact that the automaton will progress with the
first creation beyond the state of accepting a second
creation. The algorithm should thus be able to manage
the different file combinations. Similar ambiguities may
be observed with the data-flows between variables and
objects.
Ambiguities are handled by the detection algorithm
using duplication of the derivation. Before the reduction
of a transition, if the operation is potentially ambiguous,
the current state of the derivation is stored in a new triple
containing the current state and the parsing and semantic
stacks. This way, the algorithm can handle the different
combinations of events without a complete mechanism
of backtracking to come back and forth in the derivation
trees, which would have proved too cumbersome for
detection in real-time.
C. Time and space complexity
The whole process of LL-parsing is known to be linear
in time in function of the number of parsed symbols.
Because of ambiguities, the detection algorithm has a
greater complexity. Let us consider that a single call
to the parsing procedure is the reference operation.
This procedure is decomposed in three basic blocks:
matching, reduction and accept, which can be resumed
to two comparisons and a computation. Let us reason in
the worst case scenario, that is to say that, all collected
events are related to the different behavior automata and
all these related events potentially introduce ambiguities.
On the opposite, in the best case scenario, no ambiguity
is raised. The resulting complexities are given in the
Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1: In a worse case scenario, behavioral
detection using attributed automata has a time
complexity in ϑ(k(2n − 1)) and a space complexity in
ϑ(k2n(2s) where k is the number of automata, n is the
number of input symbol and s is the maximum stack
size. In a best case scenario, time complexity drops
to linear time ϑ(kn) and space complexity becomes
independent form the number of inputs ϑ(k2s).
The worst case complexity may seem important
but it quickly drops when the number of ambiguous
events decreases. The experimentations presented in
the section V. will show that the ratio of ambiguous
events is limited and the algorithm offers satisfactory
performances. These experimentations will also show
that an important ratio of ambiguous events is already a
sign of malicious activity. Based on these results, a new
assessment of the average practical complexity will be
provided.
Proof: In a best case scenario, the number of
derivation for each automaton is constant and remains
equal to one. Considering the worse case scenario, all
events are potentially ambiguous for all the current
derivations. Technically, this ambiguity multiplies by
two the number of derivations at each iteration of the
main loop. Consequently, each automaton realises 2i−1
times the loop on the different derivations at the ith
iteration of the main loop. The time complexity is
then equivalent to the number of calls to the parsing
procedure:
(1) k + 2k + ...+ 2n−1k = k(1 + 2 + ...+ 2n−1)
= k(2n − 1)
(Power sumation of the n first powers of 2)
The maximum number of derivations is reached after
the last iteration where all automata manage 2n parallel
derivations. Each derivation is stored in two stacks
of size s. This moment coincide with the maximum
occupation of the memory space:
(2) k2n(2s).
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
As presented in the previous section, we have devel-
oped a prototype in two layers: a specific layer combin-
ing data collection and abstraction and a second generic
layer for detection. The overall architecture is described
in the Figure 5. As a proof of concept, the abstraction
layer has been implemented for two different languages:
native code from PE executables and interpreted Visual
Basic Script. The detection layer is then generically
deployed above without any adaptation to the origin of
the data. The different elements of the architecture are
described in the next sub-sections.
A. Analyzer of process traces
Process traces provide useful information about the
system activity of an executable. Several tools exist to
collect such traces. Collection mechanisms are out of
the scope of this article and no collection tool has been
reimplemeted. The prototype simply uses an existing
tool to collect Windows native calls, their arguments and
returned values called NtTrace [16].
Contrary to static analysis, the main point with dy-
namic collection mechanisms (real-time or emulation
based) is that most behaviors are conditioned by external
objects and events: available target for infection or
Figure 6. Detector architecture combining detection and abstraction
layers. The abstraction layer is directly linked to the collection
mechanism. Each component of the layer interprets the specific
features of the languages whereas the object classifier is common
to all and interprets the specificity of the platform. Above this layer,
a second detection layer based on parallel behavioral automata parses
the interpreted data independently from their original source.
listening servers for network propagation for example.
In order to increase the mechanism coverage and collect
conditioned behaviors, a virtual environment has been
used satisfying most of the triggering conditions as
pictured in Figure 6. The trace collection has been
deployed over Qemu [17] using an image of a Windows
XP installation where useful services and resources have
been configured: ISP account, mail client, P2P client,
different potential targets (executable files, pictures, mu-
sic, html pages). Outside the virtual machine, different
server emulations have been deployed (DNS, SMTP).
These servers are not directly used to collect data but
their presence is mandatory to establish a connexion
and capture any network activity at the system call
level. A last remark is that malware can become inactive
beyond a predefined date, the system time has thus been
reconfigured in a previous date.
Translation is then deployed line by line on the
collected traces. It directly implements the results from
Section III for API call translation and parameter in-
terpretation. Referenced API are directly classified ac-
cording to Table 1 and an object classifier, specifically
designed for a Windows configuration, is then called on
the parameters. The API unreferenced in Table 1 are
simply ignored for the moment, until their integration in
a future version. As for the object classifier, it directly
embeds decision trees such as the ones described in the
Figures 2 and 3, but with more complete information.
Looking specifically at creation and opening interac-
tions, when resolved, a correspondence is established
between the name of the involved objects and their
references (addresses, handles); the result is then stored
in a database. Following interactions check for these
references during interpretation. Conversely, on deleting
and closing interactions, this correspondence is destroyed
for the remainder of the analysis. Names and identifiers
must be unlinked since a same address or handle number
could be reused for a different object.
During this translation process, sequences of identical
operations as well as sequences of two combined oper-
ations are detected and formatted into a loop in order to
decrease the log size.
Figure 7. Malware API calls collection environment.
B. Analyzer of Visual Basic Scripts
With regards to Visual Basic Script (VBScript),
no collection tool such as NtTrace was available.
Unfortunately, VBScript is proprietary explaining
that the few existing parsers and interpreters remain
commercial. We have thus developed our own collection
mechanism to directly embed the abstraction layer
inside, which was not feasible in a commercial product.
In addition, by developing only a partial interpreter with
restricted code execution, we have been able to increase
the performance of the instrumentation.
VBScript being an interpreted language (high-level
language), its analysis is simpler than native code
because of the visibility of the source code but also
because of some integrated safety properties: no direct
code rewriting during execution and no arbitrary
transfer of the control flow [18]. For these reasons,
path exploration becomes conceivable. To do so, we
have divided the analyzer in two parts: a first static part
collecting different information on the script structure
and normalizing the code to fight obfuscation, and a
second dynamic part exploring the different execution
paths and collecting significant events. In addition, the
object classifier has been integrated in order to type the
event-related objects.
1) Static syntactic analyzer: Syntactic analysis
heavily depends on the specification of the VBScript
language [19]. Before unfolding the different syntactic
rules, the script file is quickly parsed to localize
and retrieve the signatures of the local functions and
procedures. The script file is then parsed line by line
to collect important information which are stored in a
global structure described in the Figure 7. The declared
variables and constants are recovered from the "Dim"
and "Const" derivations. The analyzer also identifies
the important managers declared in the script: file
managers ("Scripting.FileSystemObject"),
shell managers ("WScript.Shell"), network
managers ("WScript.Network") or mail managers
("Outlook.Application","CDO").
These declaration lines as well as comment lines are
tagged to avoid any double analysis; other lines are
normalized and stored in the script structure. The first
step of code normalization is to remove the numerous
syntactic shortcuts provided by VBScript: for example,
the single-line concatenated instructions using ":"
are dispatched on independent lines, or the "With"
structure applied to a given object is reversed by
concatenating this object in head of the lines starting
with a method access. Normalization is also critical
to thwart obfuscation. Current obfuscation techniques
consist in splitting the different strings in several
substrings; characters may then be encoded into integers
using the "Chr" primitive. Normalization reverses
the process by decoding the integers into characters
and concatenating consecutive substrings into a single
one. The whole process is described in the Figure 8.
Obfuscation is also achieved in some scripts by string
encryption. String encryption techniques in VBScript
remain quite basic since the algorithm must work from
the set of printable characters to the exact same set for
the ciphered text. This explains that most algorithms
are simply based on permutations. During the static
analysis, the decryption routine is localised and copied
in a script file. This routine is finally called on-demand
with the right parameters to decipher the different
encrypted strings.
2) Dynamic interpreter:: A partial script interpreter
has been defined to explore the different execution
Figure 8. Structure of a VBScript file. This global structure stores
the important informations concerning the script: variables, managers,
functions and procedures. It also stores the normalized code for
execution exploration.
(i) execute "set QAI5NPN1 =T228IV93." & Chr(65)
& Chr(116) & Chr(116) & Chr(97) & Chr(99) &
Chr(104) & Chr(109) & Chr(101) & Chr(110) &
Chr(116) & Chr(115)
(ii) execute "set QAI5NPN1 =T228IV93." & "A" &
"t" & "t" & "a" & "c" & "h" & "m" & "e" & "n" &
"t" & "s"
(iii) execute "set QAI5NPN1
=T228IV93.Attachments"
Figure 9. Reversing obfuscation by code normalization. This portion
of obfuscated code has been extracted from a VBSWG worm variant.
Code normalization is achieved by several steps: encoded integers are
restored as characters (i− ii), splitted strings are then concatenated
(ii− iii).
paths. This interpreter is only partial in the sense that
the script code is not really executed but only significant
operations and dependencies are collected. The code is
processed line by line with detection of the numerous
syntaxes for conditional ("If...Then...Else",
"Switch") and loop ("While", "For", "For
each") structures in order to explore the different
possible paths. Calls to local procedures and functions
are also addressed by saving the current position and
jumping inside their code, however, with a particular
restriction: recursive calls have been blocked to
avoid any stack overflow. Both recursive calls and
mutual recursive calls involving multiple functions and
procedures are detected by managing a call stack.
Each script line is processed to retrieve the different
monitored API calls manipulating files, registry keys,
network connections or mails. The monitored calls are
classified according to Table 1 from Section III. In
addition, variable affectations are also important for the
data-flow and are thereby monitored. All these opera-
tions require a second level of analysis to process the
expressions used as arguments or values for affectations.
The global articulation between the different levels of
processing is schematically described in the Figure 9.
With regards to expression processing, in case of a
single element, the resolution is immediate. However,
it becomes more complicated with concatenated values
("&"): the different elements of the expressions are ana-
lyzed and only the element with the greater type is kept
as reference (see the Figure 1 for the type poset). This se-
lection is used to decrease the number of data to monitor
while focusing on more significant elements. Imbricated
calls may also be encountered inside expressions under
two forms: either res = call1(arg1).call2(arg2) or
res = call1(call2(arg2), arg1). In these particular cases,
a new intermediate object is created to store the result
of the call. Using this newly created object, a new line
is then built before to be processed like any other:
respectively int = call1(arg1) / res = int.call2(arg2)
and int = call2(arg2) / res = call1(int, arg1).
The intermediate object preserves the data-flow during
the analysis. Generally speaking the data-flow is really
important and the different references and aliases for
objects must be followed up through the processing of
expressions, and in particular at some key operations:
Local function/procedure call: Before jumping in-
side a function or a procedure, the referring
names of the arguments must be added as
references for the objects passed as parameters.
These names are actually recovered from the
static analysis of the signature. Once the whole
code executed, the added references must be
removed to prepare for a next call. In addition,
in the case of functions, the returned value must
be associated to the result variable. In VBS, the
return value is stored under an object named
liked the function. Once this value stored, the
function name must be removed from the object
reference.
Monitored API call: The API is first classified
according to the operation classes but the API
name also indicates the natures of the involved
objects. After an API call, the references are
updated for these objects as well as their type.
In case of a new object, it is typed for the first
time using the object classifier, otherwise; its
Figure 10. Articulation of the different levels of processing. This articulation is directly linked to the script structure in code blocks chained
according to the control flow.
type is refined according to its newly discov-
ered nature.
Affectation: When an affectation occurs, the
affected value is first processed as an
expression and the references of the
affected object must be updated with
the result. String processing is also very
common in VBS ("Mid, Left, Right,
LTrim, RTrim, UCase, LCase,
Replace..."): it has been treated as a
special case of affectation to avoid any loss of
the data flow.
Call to execute: The following expression must be
evaluated before to be written down in a newly
created line for processing.
3) Object classifier refinement: The same object clas-
sifier than for NtTrace can be reused like pictured
in the Figure 5. VBScript being mainly based on
character strings, the address classifier part is actu-
ally unused. However, extensions to the string clas-
sifier have been brought to best fit the script partic-
ularities. In first place, constants linked to VBScript
have been added like "Wscript.ScriptName" and
"ScriptFullName" for the self-reference. In addi-
tion scripts are launched differently from executables
offering new way to start automatically. For this reason,
boot objects have been refined such as the "Start
page" from "Internet Explorer" and configu-
ration files such as "script.ini" for "mIRC" in
case of IRC worms.
An important precision must be brought with regards
to classification: as already said, the nature of an object
may affect typing. According to the poset from the
Figure 1, a variable can not be typed as the self-
reference. This consideration has helped to avoid a few
false positives where a variable containing the name
of the script was written down in a log file, which is
common in scripts.
C. Detection automata
The transitions corresponding to the different grammar
production rules have directly been coded in a prototype.
The real implementation is similar to the algorithm
presented in Section III.
Only a few enhancements have been brought to the
algorithm in order to increase the performance. The
first enhancement is a mechanism to avoid duplicate
derivations. Coexisting derivations with identical states
and stacks would only artificially increase the number of
algorithm iterations without identifying other behaviors
than the ones already detected. The second enhancement
is related to the close and delete operations on objects.
Once again, in order to decrease the numer of iterations,
the derivations where no interactions intervene between
the opening/creation and the closing/deletion of a same
related object are destroyed. These two mechanisms
have proved helpful in regulating the number of parallel
derivations.
VI. EXPERIMENTATION AND DISCUSSIONS
For experimentation, we have gathered hundreds
of samples to confront to our prototype. The pool of
samples is divided into two categories: the Portable
Executables and the Visual Basic Scripts. For each
category, about 200 malware and 50 legitimate samples
were gathered. We have considered different types of
malware and legitimate applications as descibed by the
pool repartition in the Figure 11. These malware were
mainly downloaded from two main sources: [20] and
[21], whereas legitimate samples have been selected
from an healthy system installation.
A. Coverage
The experimentation has provided significant results
with a detection rate of 51% for PE executables and up
to 89% for VB Scripts. The detection rates, behavior
by behavior, are wholly described in the tables II and
IV. According to these tables, duplication is indeed
the most significant malicious behavior. However the
additional behaviors, and in particular residency, have
helped to detect additional malware where duplication
was missed. On the opposite, the false positive rates
presented in the table III and V are almost inexistent.
The only observed false positive can be easily explained:
the given script is a malware cleaner which reinitializes
the Internet Explorer start page after the infection.
By closely observing the results behavior by behavior,
some important false negative spikes can be localized
in the PE results (Table II): duplication detection rate
for PE Virii and propagation detection rate for Net
and Mail Worms are typical examples. In fact, these
phenomenons can mainly be explained by existing
limitations in the collection mechanisms. The impact
of the collection mechanism on the detection is not
described here but is assessed in the dedicated next
section VI.B.
By comparison between the VB scripts and the PE
traces, the obtained rates of false negatives are lower
for VB scripts. This can also be explained by the
coverage of the collection mechanism: the VB script
analyzer works statically and has been developed on
purpose; it is thus more complete. The remaining false
negatives can be explained by two problems. The first
is the ciphering of the whole malware body which is
not supported yet. This problem can be corrected in
later versions of the analyzer. The second problem is
the cohabitation in a same page of JavaScript and VB
script code which makes the syntactic analysis fail. An
additional code localisation mechanism can be added to
circumvent the problem.
Globally, with regards to existing works analyzing
system calls [5], the observed detection rates for
duplication are consistent with the results previously
obtained. In fact, the real enhancements from this work
are two folds. The first enhancement is the parallel
detection of additional behaviors described in the same
language: propagation, residency and overinfection. The
second enhancement is the possibility to feed detection
with data from other sources such as those coming from
the script analyzer.
B. Limitation of the collect mechanisms
As said in the previous section, a significant part of
the false negatives is not due neither to the abstraction
process nor the detection algorithm, but to the coverage
of the collection mechanisms. Several limitations
existing in collection mechanisms can directly explain
the missed detections of certain behaviors. However,
since our approach is based on separate layers, collection
and abstraction can be improved for a given platform
or language without modifying the upper detection layer.
1) Dynamic analysis (PE traces): Due to the dynamic
nature of the collection, the first reason for detection
failure is a problem related to the configuration of
the simulated environment. The simulation must seem
as real as possible in order to satisfy the execution
conditions of the malware, in particular for triggered
actions.
This problem can reside in the software configuration.
Considering PE Virii, 64,6% of the tested samples
(53/82) did not execute properly in the simulated
environment: invalid PE files, access violations or raised
exceptions. Most file infector virii were released before
the year 2000, explaining that the recent configuration
of the simulation environment may not support their
execution. Exceptions can also be used as anti-debug
techniques crafted to hinder dynamic analysis.
The configuration problem can also reside in the
simulated network. Considering Mail Worms, their
propagation is conditioned by the network configuration.
75% of the Mail Worms (45/60) did not show any
SMTP activity simply because the required server
was not reachable. Likewise, Net Worms propagate
through vulnerabilities only if a vulnerable target is
reachable. The absence of potential targets explains that
93,33% of the worms did not show any propagation
(14/15). All actions conditioned by the configuration
of the simulated environment are difficult to observe: a
potential solution could be forced branching.
Figure 11. Repartition of the test pool.
Behaviors EmW P2PW V NtW Trj Global
Duplication 41(68,33%) 31(77,5%) 15(18,29%) 8(53,33%) 6(30%) 46,54%
By direct copy 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By single read/write 41(68,33%) 30(75%) 14(17,07%) 8(53,33%) 6(30%) 45,63%
By interleaved read/write 9(15%) 3(7,5%) 3(3,66%) 3(0,2%) 0(0%) 8,29%
Propagation 4(6,67%) 19(47,5%) 3(3,66%) 1(6,67%) 0(0%) 12,44%
By direct copy 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By single read/write 4(6,67%) 19(47,5%) 3(3,66%) 1(6,67%) 0(0%) 12,44%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Residency 36(60%) 22(55%) 5(60,98%) 6(40%) 9(45%) 35,94%
Overinfection test 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
by conditional 1 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
by inverse conditional 2 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Global detection 43(71,67%) 33(82,50%) 16(19,51%) 8(53,33%) 11(55,00%) 51,15%
Table II
PE MALWARE DETECTION RATES (EMW = EMAIL WORMS, P2PW = PEER-TO-PEER WORMS, V = VIRII, NTW = NET WORMS, TRJ =
TROJANS).
Beyond the configuration problem, the level of
the collection can also explain the detection failure.
With a low level collection mechanism, the visibility
scope over the performed actions and the data flow
is increased. All flow-sensitive behaviors such as
duplication can be missed because of a breakdown in
the data flow. Such breakdowns can find their origin
in non monitored system calls but above all in the
intervention of intermediate buffers where all operations
are executed in memory. These buffers are often
used in code mutations for example (polymorphism,
metamorphism). Considering once again Virii, 12,20%
additional samples (10/82) were missed because of a
data flow breakdown. The problem is identical with
the mail propagation: 8,33% of the propagations (5/60)
were missed for Mail Worms because of an intermediate
buffer intervening in the Base 64 encoding. These
problems do not come from the grammatical signature
of the behavior but from NtTrace which does not capture
processor instructions. More complete collection tools
either collecting instructions [22] or deploying tainting
techniques [23], [24] could avoid these breakdowns in
the data flow.
2) Static analysis (VB scripts): Considering VB
Scripts, the interpreted nature of the language implies a
different context where the whole code is made available.
Therefore, using static analysis, branching exploration
becomes feasible and the whole data flow becomes
observable. The VB Script analyzer implements these
features, compensating for the drawbacks of NtTrace
and eventually resulting in better detection rates.
On the other hand, contrary to the relatively restricted
number of system calls, the VB Script language offers
numerous services to monitor. A same operation can
be achieved using different managers or interfacing
with different Microsoft applications. Considering
the actual version of the analyzer, additional features
could be monitored for a greater coverage: accesses to
Messenger services or the support of the "Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI)" which
would require parsing database requests. For example,
listing connected drives for propagation is currently
supported by the analyzer but this same list could be
recovered using WMI by querying the LogicalDisk
Behaviors ComE MM Off Sec SysU Global
Duplication 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By direct copy 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By single read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Propagation 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By direct copy 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By single read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Residency 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Overinfection test 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
by conditional 1 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
by inverse conditional 2 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Global detection 0(0,00%) 0(0,00%) 0(0,00%) 0(0,00%) 0(0,00%) 0,00%
Table III
PE LEGITIMATE SAMPLES DETECTION RATES (COM = COMMUNICATION & EXCHANGE APPLICATIONS, MM = MULTIMEDIA
APPLICATIONS, OFF = OFFICE APPLICATIONS, SEC = SECURITY APPLICATIONS, SYSU = SYSTEM & UTILITIES).
Behaviors EmW FdW IrcW P2PW V Gen Global
Nb string ciphered 1/51 0/4 1/26 0/30 3/61 10/30 15/202
Nb body ciphered 4/51 0/4 0/26 1/30 2/61 0/30 7/202
String encryption detection 1(100%) 0 0 0(0%) 2(66,67%) 10(100%) 86,67%
Duplication 43(84,31%) 4(100%) 20(76,96%) 22(73,33%) 44(72,13%) 30(100%) 80,70%
By direct copy 41(80,39%) 4(100%) 20(76,96%) 22(73,33%) 25(40,98%) 30(100%) 70,30%
By single read/write 8(15,69%) 0(0%) 4(15,38%) 3(10%) 21(34,43%) 0(0%) 17,82%
By interleaved read/write 1(1,96%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 8(13,11%) 0(0%) 4,46%
Propagation 33(64,71%) 3(75%) 5(19,23%) 25(83,33%) 5(8,20%) 30(100%) 49,99%
By direct copy 33(64,71%) 3(75%) 4(15,38%) 25(83,33%) 3(4,92%) 30(100%) 48,52%
By single read/write 3(5,88%) 0(0%) 2(7,69%) 1(3,33%) 2(3,28%) 0(0%) 3,96%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Residency 32(62,75%) 4(100%) 20(76,92%) 18(60,00%) 20(32,79%) 30(100%) 61,39%
Overinfection test 4(7,84%) 1(25%) 1(3,85%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2,97%
by conditional 1 4(7,84%) 1(25%) 1(3,85%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 2,97%
by inverse conditional 2 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0,00%
Global detection 46(90,20%) 4(100%) 25(96,15%) 27(90,00%) 50(81,97%) 30(100%) 90,09%
Table IV
VBSCRIPT MALWARE DETECTION RATES (EMW = EMAIL WORMS, FDW = FLASH DRIVE WORMS, IRCW = IRC WORMS, P2PW =
PEER-TO-PEER WORMS, V = VIRII, GEN = VARIANTS FROM MALWARE GENERATORS).
entries from the "Win32_ComputerSystem" object.
Moreover, like any other static analysis, the script
analysis can be hindered by encryption and obfuscation
techniques. The current version of the analyzer can
partially handle these techniques as described in
the section 5.B. Globally, static analysis is easier to
consider with scripts because no prior disassembly is
required and several security locks ease the analysis:
no dynamic code rewriting, no dynamically resolved
jumps. However, recent works have shown that inserting
an intermediate interpretation layer could reintroduce all
obfuscation techniques possible in low level languages
(C, assembly) [18].
C. Behavior relevance
The previous section deals with problems related to
the collection mechanisms, but the behavioral model
must be assessed itself. The relevance of each behavior
must be individually assessed by checking the cov-
erage of its grammatical model. Once the relevances
determined, it becomes possible to extrapolate possible
correlations between the different behaviors.
Some behaviors such as duplication, propagation and
residency are obviously characteristic to malware. Du-
plication and propagation are enough discriminating for
detection. The only one of these behaviors likely to
Behaviors EmM InfC Enc DfE MwC RegR Global
Nb string ciphered 0/14 0/10 0/4 0/16 0/8 0/8 0/50
Nb body ciphered 0/14 0/10 0/4 0/16 0/8 0/8 0/50
String encryption detection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%
Duplication 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By direct transfer 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By single read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
Propagation 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By direct transfer 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By single read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
By interleaved read/write 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
Residency 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(12,50%) 0(0%) 1,67%
Overinfection test 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
by conditional 1 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
by inverse conditional 2 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0%
Global detection 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1(12,5%) 0(0%) 1,67%
Table V
VBSCRIPT LEGITIMATE SAMPLES DETECTION RATES (EMM = EMAIL MANAGERS, INFC = INFORMATTION COLLECTORS, ENC =
ENCODERS, DFE = DISK AND FILE EXPLORERS, MWC = MALWARE CLEANERS, REGR = REGISTRY REPAIRS).
occur in legitimate programs is residency, during a
program installation for example. The behavioral model
should thus be refined in future works, using additional
constraints on the value written to the booting object:
the value should refer to the program itself or to one
of its duplicated versions. This modification could help
avoiding the remaining false positives observed.
On the other hand, the model of the overinfection
test does not seem completely relevant. The problem
comes from a description too much restraint, which
limits its detection. In particular, the conditional structure
intervening in the model can not be detected in system
call traces. A generalization of the model would increase
its detection but the risk of confusion with error handling
in legitimate programs would heavily increase. For future
works, it would be interesting to test a new description
of the overinfection test as well as additional behaviors.
D. Performance
NtTrace Data reduction from PE traces to logs
Analyzer Total size: 351,32Mo Average: 1,32Mo/Trace
Reduced logs: 11,85Mo Reduction ratio: 29
Execution speed
Single core M 1,4GHz Dual core 2,6GHz
1,48 s/trace 0,34 s/trace
VB Script Data reduction from VB scripts to logs
Analyzer Total size: 1842Ko Average: 7Ko/Script
Reduced logs: 298Ko Reduction ratio: 6
Execution speed
Single core M 1,4GHz Dual core 2,6GHz
0,042 s/script 0,016 s/script
+0,50 s/ciphered line +0,21 s/cipered line
Detection Execution speed
Automata Single core M 1,4GHz Dual core 2,6GHz
NT: 0,44 s/log NT: 0,14 s/log
VBS: 0,002 s/log VBS: <0,001 s/log
The table above provides the measured performances
for the different components of the prototype. With
regards to the abstraction layer, the analysis of PE
script seems the most time consuming task. This is
not surprising since the analyzer uses lots of string
comparisons which could be partially avoided by re-
placing the off-line analysis by real time collection and
translation. By hooking directly the system calls, the
translation becomes immediate and does not require
cumbersome comparisons. On the other hand, the Visual
basic script analyzer seems lighter and offers satisfying
performances. Once optimized, it could be deployed on
mail servers to analyze joint pieces for example.
With regards to the detection automata, the perfor-
mances are also satisfying compared with the worst
case complexity defined in Proposition 1. The detection
speed remains far below the order of a half second in
more than 90% of the cases; the remaining 10% cases
were all malware. The automata implementation has
also revealed that the maximum required space for the
syntactic and semantic stacks was very low: 7 elements
and 3 elements are the respective maximal sizes reached
by the prototype for the syntactic and semantic stacks
(2s < 10 in Proposition 1.). In addition to speed, the
number of raised ambiguities has also been measured. If
we denote ne the number of events and na the number
of ambiguity. In a worst case scenario, we would have
na = 2ne . By experience we have:
na << 2ne
na << n
2
e
na ≈ αne
This approximation provides a new practical com-
plexity in ϑ(kα(n2+n2 )) which is more worth consid-
ering. Moreover, this algorithm can easily be parallelized
for optimization in the new multi-core architectures. The
Figure 12 and 13 provide graphs of the collected α ratios.
From these graphs, it can be observed that above a
certain threshold, an important ratio of ambiguity α
is already a sign of malicious activity.
Figure 12. PE Ambiguity Ratio. Abscissa: intervals of α values /
Ordinate: number of samples in the interval.
Figure 13. VBS Ambiguity Ratio. Abscissa: intervals of α values /
Ordinate: number of samples in the interval.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Detection by attribute automata provides a good
detection coverage of malware using known techniques
with 51% of detected PE malware and 89% of Visual
Basic Scripts malware. The grammatical approach
offers a synthetic and understandable vision of
malicious behaviors. Indeed, only four generic, human-
readable, behavioral descriptions have resulted in these
significant detection rates. Unknown malware using
variations from these known techniques should remain
detected thanks to the abstraction process. In case of
innovative techniques, this approach eases the update
process. Thanks to the decoupled layers for abstraction
and detection, updates can be independently applied
at two levels: in the grammatical descriptions in case
of new generic procedures (the less frequent), or in
the abstraction components in case of new vulnerable
objects or API (the most frequent).
Up until now, the generation of the behavioral
descriptions is still manual but the process could be
combined with the identification of malicious behaviors
by differential analysis proposed by Christodorescu, Jha
and Kruegel [4].
The experimentations have also stressed the
importance of the collection mechanism in the
detection process. Collection mechanisms are already
an active research field and future work can be testing
more adapted collection tools deploying tainting.
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